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Abstract 
Path dependencies associated with the firm’s evolving resource endowments lead to redundancies, 
which makes it sub-optimal to attain sustainable competitive advantage based on these resource 
bundles. In this context, managers can play a proactive role by ensuring that resource endowments 
continue to remain beneficial for their organizations. By suggesting such a linkage and the enabling 
role of managers, I provide a way to integrate core arguments of two of the foremost organizational 
theories in vogue: resource-based theory (RBT) and upper echelons theory (UET). 
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1. Introduction 
According to the resource-based theory (RBT), a firm achieves sustainable competitive advantage 
based on valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable resource bundles or endowments (Barney, 
1991; Rumelt, 1985; Wernerfelt, 1984). Having access to these resources allows the firm to achieve 
competitive superiority in the marketplace and enables it to earn super-normal profits (Dierickx & Cool, 
1989). Barney (1991) notes that firm-level resource endowments take time to develop and have 
associated path dependencies. “Indeed, … not only are firms intrinsically historical and social entities, 
but that their ability to acquire and exploit some resources depends upon their place in time and 
space… performance of a firm does not depend simply on the industry structure within which a firm 
finds itself at a particular point in time, but also on the path a firm followed through history to arrive 
where it is” (Barney, 1991: 107-108). Even though the early RBT researchers recognized it, the 
path-dependent nature of evolution of resource endowments has received little attention. Instead, the 
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ever growing body of research in this stream has tended to adopt a rather static or “snap shot” view of 
the RBT, considering VRIN resource endowments as being already available to the firm and then 
accounting for the impact these resources have in providing the firm with competitive advantage. This 
approach has resulted in researchers critiquing RBT as being tautological and impossible to disprove 
(Priem and Butler, 2001a; Priem and Butler, 2001b).  
In this paper, I contend that further development of the RBT must refocus attention of researchers to its 
hitherto ignored dynamic and “action-oriented” aspect. In doing so, researchers will take the theory to 
the next stage of its evolution. Specifically, I discuss (i) how path dependencies associated with 
resource endowments come to play a critical role in leading some resource bundles (but not others) to 
acquire VRIN characteristics, and (ii) the critical role the firm’s top management plays in this regard. In 
doing so, I suggest time is ripe for a synthesis of two popular theories of the firm: the RBT with the 
Upper Echelons Theory (UET). 
 
2. The Idea of Path Dependence 
2.1 Defining Path Dependence 
In assessing the economic action by firms and institutions, the idea of path dependence has been 
offered as a radically different theoretical alternative to conventional neo-classical economics 
(Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995). While it can be simply stated as “history matters”, various authors 
have defined path dependence in closely related, even if distinct, ways as:  
“…the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence” (Peirson, 1994: 252); 
“…the set of dynamic processes where small events have long-lasting consequences that economic 
action at each moment can modify yet only to a limited extent” (Antonelli, 1997: 643-644); 
“…the dependence of economic outcomes on the path of previous outcomes, rather than simply on 
current conditions” (Puffert, 2003:1); 
“…those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event 
chains that have deterministic properties” (Mahoney, 2000: 507); 
“…a system… in which outcomes are related stochastically to initial conditions, and the particular 
outcome that obtains in any given ‘run’ of the system depends on the choices or outcomes of 
intermediate events between the initial conditions and the outcome” (Goldstone, 1998: 834); or 
“…includes features such as sustained persistency and lock-in” (Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch, 2009: 
4). 
David (1985) offers a more technical definition by contrasting “path dependent” processes with “path 
independent” processes. While path independent processes converge to a globally stable equilibrium 
configuration and are ergodic (i.e. have a capacity to shake free from the influence of their past states), 
path dependent or non-ergodic processes cannot do so and the history of their previous states does 
matter. David provides the following two contrasting definitions for path dependence: 
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A negative definition: Processes that are non-ergodic, and thus unable to shake free of their history, are 
said to yield path dependent outcomes. 
A positive definition: A path dependent stochastic process is one whose asymptotic distribution evolves 
as a consequence (function of) the process’s own history” (1985: 5). 
Basically, both these definitions suggest that a path dependent process may not converge to a globally 
stable equilibrium. Depending on how the process evolves, an innumerable number of end-states are 
theoretically possible and equally likely.  
2.2 Characteristics of Path Dependence 
Researchers (e.g., Ackermann, 2001; Arthur, 1994; Ebbinghaus, 2005) suggest that a path dependent 
model exhibits the following characteristics: (i) a single set of starting conditions with a fixed 
probability of occurrence; (ii) any one of multiple, equally likely equilibria or end states; and (iii) 
self-reinforcing intermediate processes that lead to movement towards an end-state, possibly causing 
irreversibility, increasing returns and ultimate lock-in, perhaps on an inefficient outcome. Based on this, 
Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) identify three distinct forms of path dependence. First-degree path 
dependence occurs when the process begins with specified initial conditions but does not end up on an 
inefficient end-state. Second-degree path dependence also begins with the specified initial conditions 
but leads to an outcome that is inefficient (regrettable, with hindsight) and costly or impossible to 
change. Finally, third-degree path dependence is when the initial conditions are as specified and leading 
to an inefficient outcome that, nevertheless, may be remedied without incurring significant cost.  
Under path dependence, the more a current action is adopted, the greater its benefits (i.e., “increasing 
returns”). This is how the situation comes to be adopted even if, theoretically, a radically different 
course of action might have yielded a far higher return. Over time, the system achieves a “lock-in” with 
the current course of action because too many people have adopted it (Page, 2006). In the case of firm 
resources and capabilities, the impact of path dependence is critical to understand. The resources a firm 
begins with at inception and develops or nurtures over time may not lead to the best combination (i.e. a 
globally stable equilibrium) of resource endowments for achieving competitive advantage. What 
critically matters is the historical trajectory traced by these resource endowments over time. Further, 
even if two competing firms possess nearly the same resource bundles to begin with, because of their 
unique histories the end-state resource endowments may markedly differ, thus providing the firms with 
varying levels of competitive advantage.  
 
3. New Venture Creation, Entrepreneurial Action and Emergence of Resource Endowments 
3.1 Resource-Based Theory of the Firm 
In the last two decades, resource-based theory (RBT) of the firm (Barney, 1986, 1991, 2001; Rumelt, 
1984; Wernerfelt, 1984) has been recognized as a powerful framework to explain how firms achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage through possession of unique resources. With its origins in the 
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seminal works of Selznick (1957) and Penrose (1959), RBT posits that strategic resource bundles or 
endowments (Wernerfelt, 1984, 1995) owned or controlled by the firm (Barney, 1991) form the basis of 
its competitive advantage, provided these resource endowments are heterogeneous (unique), sticky 
(immobile), only imperfectly imitable, imperfectly substitutable (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993; 
Silverman, 1999) - collectively termed as VRIN or valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
(Barney, 1991).  
Barney defines firm resources to include “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm 
attributes, information, knowledge etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (1991: 101). While this definition is 
sufficiently broad-based to include within its ambit a number of organizational attributes all of which 
can qualify as firm resources, it is important to note that resources do not arise in isolation but rather 
combine as bundles or endowments. Firms balance their efforts at acquiring strategic resource 
endowments in a ‘strategic factor market’ (Barney, 1986) with creation of a ‘privileged asset position’ 
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989) in-house, thus making themselves distinct from their competitors. 
Competitors find it difficult to imitate/replicate VRIN resource endowments because of time 
compression diseconomies, asset mass inefficiencies, inter-connectedness of asset stocks, asset erosion, 
and causal ambiguity associated with their development (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). In effect, the 
incumbent firm is able to build certain “isolating mechanisms” (Rumelt, 1984) around itself (akin to 
mobility barriers) that keeps competitors at bay and allows it to earn super normal profits. 
3.2 Entrepreneurial Action and Creation of Resource Endowments 
While possession of unique resource bundles allows a firm to achieve sustainable competitive 
advantage, a question remaining unanswered is how does a firm achieve this pre-eminent position? 
Because every firm must begin its existence as an entrepreneurial venture, it is reasonable to assume 
that action taken by the entrepreneur at the early stages of the firm’s life-cycle, followed by the path 
dependent nature of such actions, must have led the firm to its position of competitive advantage. In 
fact, resource bundles develop within a new venture as the outcome of entrepreneurial action, as the 
entrepreneur identifies and goes about exploiting an opportunity at hand (Galuncic and Rodan, 1998; 
Matthews, 2002).  
As a field of economic activity, entrepreneurship has been defined as the nexus of enterprising 
individuals and valuable opportunities (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; 
Venkataraman, 1997). Entrepreneurs work with a number of constraints: they must identify, capture and 
exploit a fleeting opportunity, and be able to do this mostly with limited resources at their disposal. In 
effect, entrepreneurship turns out to be a disequilibriating process of allocating limited resources to 
meet emerging needs, and optimization of the process through exercising creativity (Eckhardt and 
Shane, 2003). In considering the linkages between entrepreneurship and RBT, Alvarez and Busenitz 
(2001) suggest that cognitive ability of manager-entrepreneurs plays a critical role assembling of 
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resources for a new venture that can take advantage of an emerging opportunity. In sourcing resource 
combinations and setting a path and direction for building resource endowments, entrepreneurs must 
strike a delicate balance between current versus future needs of the firm. As resource acquisition and 
utilization processes within the new firm get constituted and come to be practiced, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to substantially modify or change the contours of these processes because of 
irreversible commitments (Ghemawat, 1986), rules, routines and incentive structures that are now 
firmly in place (Heffernan, 2003). It is possible that some entrepreneurs accomplish this task more 
effectively than others. Those that are able to achieve such an effective balance set in motion path 
dependent processes that lead the firm towards future lock-in, but towards development of appropriate 
resource bundles to achieve future sustainable competitive advantage.  
In contrast, entrepreneurs that have failed to achieve such a balance will have put in place associated 
path dependent processes that may meet immediate requirements of resources but that lock the firm 
into a resource position scenario that is clearly inadequate to meet the firm’s future needs for 
sustainable competitive advantage. And yet, once such path dependent processes are put in place, they 
acquire a life of their own and are difficult, if not impossible, to change. Therefore, I suggest: 
Proposition 1a: The basis of a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage come from the salient 
entrepreneurial actions initiated with respect to building resource endowments during the firm’s 
inception stage, and the subsequent path dependent nature of these actions. 
Proposition 1b: Entrepreneurs who are able to more effectively project the new venture’s immediate 
versus long-term resource needs and creatively manage this process of building resource endowments 
set up in place path dependent processes that lead the firm towards future sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
The path dependent process for building resource bundles for sustainable competitive advantage, or 
otherwise, commences with entrepreneurial action during the inception of the new venture. But this 
process is further affected through managerial action during subsequent stages of the firm’s life cycle. 
This happens in different ways. 
 
4. Firm Evolution, Managerial Action, and Further Development of Resource Endowments  
4.1 Upper Echelons Theory 
As the new venture progresses and grows, usually there occurs an expansion in the firm’s top 
management team (TMT), with induction of a group of professional managers. Sometimes, the lead 
entrepreneur may even relinquish charge and hand over the reins of managing the organization in the 
hands of a newly recruited TMT. The upper echelons theory (UET) (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) 
suggests a firm is a reflection of its top managers: the TMT (including the CEO) exercise a dominant 
influence on the firm’s strategy and outcomes. By drawing upon their knowledge, experience and 
values, executives act based on their personalized interpretation and judgment of the strategic situations 
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the firm is facing (Hambrick, 2007). As the TMT goes about exercising strategic choice and managing 
the firm, their executive decisions lead to path dependent outcomes for the firm. Specifically, the firm’s 
managers bring about a transformation in the resource endowments, and through this, on the firm’s 
sustainable competitive advantage position. They do this in two ways. 
 
4.2 Managers as Sources of Superior Rents 
There is a growing body of literature in the RBT tradition that identifies managers as a critical VRIN 
resource within the firm. Castanias and Helfat (1991) have elaborated on the role the firm’s top 
management play in generating firm rents. Because competent senior managers come with superior 
levels of generic, industry-related, and firm-specific rare skills, they are able to generate both Ricardian 
(scarcity) rents and quasi (difference in values between an asset’s first best use and next best use) rents 
for the firm. For example, in an industry at a specific point in time if only one competing firm amongst 
several has available to itself the services of a highly talented CEO with some very rare skills, 
knowledge, leadership talent and charisma, then following from RBT that firm will have a unique 
source of competitive advantage that is not available to its competitors. 
The processes involved in recruiting, training, and placing the firm’s TMT on assignments that have the 
greatest fit with their talent and experience background are not stand-alone outcomes but have 
associated path dependencies. It is reasonable to expect that a firm that commences its operations with 
a highly talented pool of TMT will have a head start over rivals that did not have access to such 
managerial talent. Also, during periods of strategic change within the firm, I can expect that an earlier 
sequence of path dependent TMT processes will be dissolved and a new sequence of path dependent 
processes will be put in place. At this time too, the managerial talent and quality of the TMT ushering 
in such strategic change will have an important bearing on the competitive advantage that will result. 
Therefore, I suggest: 
Proposition 2a: A firm that had access to high quality managerial talent during the early stages of its 
life-cycle will display higher subsequent performance compared to a rival that did not have access to 
such talent. 
Proposition 2b: A firm that had access to high quality managerial talent during a period of episodic 
strategic change will display higher subsequent performance compared to a rival that did not have 
access to such talent. 
4.3 Managers as Creators of Superior Rents 
Penrose (1959) had noted what is done with administration of strategic resources is as important as the 
quality of the resources themselves. She classifies resources as falling into two categories – productive 
versus administrative. While productive resources constitute the strategic resources themselves, 
administrative resources signify the quality of administrative or managerial decisions that are made 
connected with these resources, which ultimately leads to resource performance (Hansen, Perry & 
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Reese, 2004). Similarly, in his ten-year retrospective on the RBT Wernerfelt identifies the “governance 
structure within which a firm can leverage its resources” as being a critical missing piece of the RBV 
(1995: 172).  
Following from the upper echelons theory, executive managers play the role of facilitators and creators 
of superior rent based on their actions towards developing other VRIN resource endowments. Because 
members of the TMT are greatly influenced by their own set of experiences, values, biases, and 
personality characteristics, this leads them to view and interpret emerging strategic situations 
differently. Most environmental, institutional and organizational issues executives need to consider in 
their decision-making are not only complex but also characterized by a lack of full information. This 
lack of full information, together with the boundedly rational nature of managerial work, make it 
necessary for executives to fall back on their own experiences in assessing an external situation and 
making the best decisions they can under the circumstances. In effect, managerial discretion comes into 
play as executives make decisions with complex and partial information (Hambrick and Abrahamson, 
1995; Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). 
Castanias and Helfat note that “managerial discretion may be an important ingredient in the production 
of rents” (1991: 157). It is not difficult to see that the discretionary role of managers has an impact on 
the creation of VRIN resource endowments. Even though strategic resource endowments form the basis 
of the firm’s sustainable competitive advantage at any point in time, what perhaps matters even more 
are the path dependencies that such resource bundles trace over time. Coff emphasizes this when he 
remarks, “…if… the firm is a unique bundle of resources, it stands to reason that I must define the firm 
to highlight what holds the bundle together” (1999: 120). I suggest such a critical role is played by the 
firm’s TMT. The firm’s managers need to synchronize their power of discretion with the path 
dependent nature of the emergent process of development of resource bundles. Managers that do so 
will lead the firm in coming up with resource endowments that are more apt for developing and 
maintaining sustainable competitive advantage. At the same time, if managers do not have the 
motivation and energy to direct such efforts or if they are misdirected, the firm’s resources will fail to 
generate rents (Castanias and Helfat, 2001). Therefore, I suggest: 
Proposition 3: A firm whose managers exercise discretion in building resource endowments in line with 
emerging internal and external changes will perform better than rival firms whose managers do not do 
so. 
 
5. Conclusion: Managers, Path Dependence of Their Actions, and Reciprocal Influences 
As noted earlier, the principal characteristics of path dependence include: (i) multiple equilibria, even if 
the starting conditions were the same with same probabilities; (ii) self-reinforcing processes with 
increasing returns; (iii) lock-in; and (iv) potential for reinforcing inefficient paths (Ebbinghaus, 2005). 
In the context of evolution of resource endowments and the ways by which managers influence the 
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process, these characteristics have important ramifications. First, action initiated on resource 
acquisition, allocation, revamping and addition by managers over time may lead to differences in 
outcomes in different firms, even if these firms happen to be in the same industry, are rivals, and/or 
were set up with similar initial resource configurations. Second, given the self-reinforcing nature of 
these processes, it will most likely be the case that after an elapsed time the firm’s leadership will come 
to accept the resource endowments that have so far emerged. They will likely have little inclination to 
radically change these. In fact, use of available resource endowments by a group of users will lead 
others in the firm to adopt them too. Thus, return on the use of such resource endowments will increase 
over time. Third, resource endowments will come to demonstrate lock-in. The sunk costs of the 
managers’ efforts at developing resource endowments will preclude them from switching over to a 
radically different/alternate path for developing new resources. Finally, it is likely that resource 
endowments and their utilization might lead firms to actually adopt inefficient paths in their attempt to 
build sustainable competitive advantage. 
These are the potential negative influences of path dependence on resource endowments. Yet, it is quite 
possible that an alternate positive spiral can be set in motion by the TMT, one that leads firms to build 
resource endowments fulfilling the VRIN characteristics. This can happen if managers exercise care in 
using the catalytic effects of path dependence in a positive direction. Carpenter, Geletkanycz and 
Sanders (2005) suggest that in making organizational decisions, managers are guided not just by the 
past events but also their goals and aspirations. If managers engage in introspection and careful 
continuous assessment of the likely implications of their past decisions, they will be able to overcome 
some of the debilitating influence of path dependence associated with resource endowments. Therefore, 
going forward I suggest that the essentially reciprocal nature of the influence of managers and the 
associated path dependence of their actions in building resource endowments should become a key 
focus area for future RBT research. As this happens, I expect to see closer integration of the two 
currently dominant theories in strategic management – RBT and Upper Echelons Theory. To conclude, 
I suggest that the next generation of RBT researchers must go beyond studying and assessing the 
cross-sectional elements of the theory, i.e. the impact or otherwise of resources and capabilities on 
sustainable competitive advantage. They must begin to consider the dynamic, processual, 
path-dependent aspects of the phenomenon by engaging in rich theory development as well as 
incorporating innovative methods of longitudinal design and modeling in their empirical assessments. 
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